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Trust Not Their Presents, Nor Admit
the Horse: Countering the Technically-
Based Espionage Threat
Robert Gray Bracknell*
0 wretched countrymen! what fury reigns?
What more than madness has possess'd your brains?
Think you the Grecians from your coasts are gone?
And are Ulysses' arts no better known?
This hollow fabric either must inclose,
Within its blind recess, our secret foes;
Or 't is an engine rais'd above the town,
T' o'erlook the walls, and then to batter'down.
Somewhat is sure design'd, by fraud or force:
Trust not their presents, nor admit the horse.
Virgil, The Aeneid
Book II, Section 1 1
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1. VIRGIL, THE AENEID OF VIRGIL 25 (J.W. Mackail, M.A. trans., 1885).
Virgil's epic The Aeneid chronicles the story of the Trojan hero and founder of
Rome Aeneas, who escaped Troy with his father and son after the city was
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I. INTRODUCTION
States spy on one another, because all states want to know
what the other ones are up to. The trick, then, is to be effective
with your own spying, while limiting the effect of the other states'
spying. This Article seeks to offer policy recommendations
regarding a specific subset of this epic problem: countering the
espionage of foreign powers - states, particularly China;2 non-
state actors, including organized crime syndicates and
transnational terrorists; and ordinarily legitimate business
organizations - through technical means, such as compromising
U.S. information systems through hacking, electronic surveillance
of U.S. information assistance, and cyberattack. Fourteenth
century Chinese war philosopher Sun Tzu's offers pithy
observations regarding espionage and spycraft:
All warfare is based on deception. There is no place
where espionage is not used. ... Be extremely subtle, even
to the point of formlessness. Be extremely mysterious,
even to the point of soundlessness. Thereby you can be
the director of the opponent's fate. ...A military operation
involves deception. Even though you are competent,
appear to be incompetent. Though effective, appear to be
ineffective. 3
Bearing in mind that Sun Tzu's philosophy may pervade Chinese
strategic planning,4 and certainly influences U.S. planning, the
sacked by the Greeks. The Greek army was led by Ulysses, using the
legendary Trojan horse to effect clandestine entry to the walled city. The
Trojans were routed. See generally id.
2. For the purposes of this paper, I concentrate specifically on China as
an emerging state-based rival with an active espionage/counterintelligence
program. Such concentration should not be interpreted to exclude
consideration of other state rivals or competitors, such as Russia, France,
Iran, India, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, Israel, or any one of
another dozen states or non-state actors with varying degrees of technical
espionage capacity.
3. SUN Tzu (CHINESE GENERAL AND STRATEGIST), THE ART OF WAR (circa
400 B.C.).
4. See, e.g., China's Strategic Intentions and Goals: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on Armed Services, 106th Cong. (2000) 14, 17-18 (testimony of
Larry M. Wortzel, Director, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation)
(Beijing has turned one of the maxims of Sunzi (or Sun-tsu, author of The Art
of War), into a twenty-first-century security strategy. China is "attacking the
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U.S. must be specifically concerned regarding the presence of a
subtle, soundless and formless Chinese threat lurking to collect
information that would direct the U.S. fate in the budding
interstate competition.
The People's Republic of China is emerging as the possible
leading state-based rival of the U.S. for the twenty-first century,5
the way that the Soviet Union, and, to a lesser extent, the Third
Reich and Imperial Japan served as state-based strategic
opponents in the last century, and Great Britain in the early part
of the century prior. It stands to reason, then, that the U.S. would
seek to gain and maintain an information advantage with regard
to China - we want to know what they are doing, planning, and
thinking, while denying them access to the same information
pertaining to the U.S. Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu's
sublime aphorisms regarding espionage, deception, and
information security are apropos counsel for assessing the Chinese
approach, and defining U.S. policy on this issue. I seek to define
the problem of technically-based espionage; identify methods and
techniques that foreign powers employ to realize espionage
activities; propose legally-based avenues of attacking the problem
through detection and deterrence; and make recommendations on
any necessary legislative reform required to leverage a well-
enemy's strategy" (gu shang bing fa mou) by portraying the U.S. policy of
engagement with China as a new form of "containment," putting Washington
and the U.S. Department of Defense on the defensive in policy discussions.
Then Beijing is "attacking the enemy's alliances" (qi ci fa jiao) by seeking to
undermine the system of alliances and long-standing friendships nurtured in
Asia by the United States and replace them with its web of strategic
partnerships.
5. See generally Wang Jisi, China's Search for Stability with America,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 15230994;
Kishore Mahbubani, Understanding China, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct.
2005, available at 2005 WLNR 15231014. Espionage threats are, of course,
not limited to China; even U.S. "allies" spy on the U.S. See generally
Economic Espionage: Information on Threat From U.S. Allies, Statement for
the Record, Testimony Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 104th Cong.
16-17 (1996) (statement of David E. Cooper, Associate Director, Defense
Acquisitions Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division),
available at http://nsi.org/Library/Espionage/allies.txt; Tilting the Playing
Field: Economic Espionage Hasn't Gone Away Since 9/11, THE JEWISH
INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, Jan. 28, 2005,
http://www.jinsa.org/articles/articles.html/function/view/categoryid2518/docu
mentid/2835/ history/3,2360,656,1082,2518,2835 (citing France and European
Union states generally as principal economic espionage threats).
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positioned commercial enterprise to effect a more robust defense
against technically-based espionage. Espionage is a threat to the
security and prosperity of the United States, a nation of laws - so
we ought to be able to use law as a tool to detect it, deter it, and
attack it.6
II. DEFINING AND FRAMING THE ISSUES
On January 19, 2002, The Washington Post broke a story
regarding purported U.S. attempts to spy on China.7 The Chinese
government had recently purchased a Boeing 767-300ER jetliner
for use as Chinese President Jiang Zemin's official state aircraft.8
Presumably during security sweeps by Chinese
counterintelligence personnel, the aircraft was discovered to have
contained around two dozen surveillance and listening devices
embedded throughout the plane,9 including in Zemin's bedroom.
The aircraft had been customized in San Antonio, Texas by four
subcontractors for President Zemin's use.10 It is uncertain as to
exactly when the listening devices were inserted, or even whether
U.S. intelligence agencies were, in fact, responsible for the
installation of the surveillance gadgets 1" - though it is a fair
6. The use of law and legal processes offensively or in a proactive
defensive manner has been termed "lawfare" by some forward-leaning
commentators. See Lawfare, the Latest in Asymmetrics (Transcript of FY03
National Security Roundtable), COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Mar. 18,
2003, http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=5772 ("Lawfare is a strategy of
using or misusing law as a substitute for traditional military means to
achieve military objectives.")
7. John Pomfret, China Finds Bugs on Jet Equipped in U.S., WASH.
POST, Jan. 19, 2002, at Al.
8. Pomfret, supra note 7, at Al; Jim Hoagland, Editorial, Bugs in U.S.-
China Relations, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2002, at B7; John Pomfret, Beijing
Plays Down Bugging of Airplane, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2002, at A14.
9. Pomfret, supra note 7, at Al; Hoagland, supra note 8, at B7; Pomfret,
supra note 8, at A14; Chinese Leader's Plane 'Bugged,' BBC NEWS, Jan. 19,
2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/1769642.stm.
10. See Pomfret, supra note 7, at Al.
11. See Charles R. Smith, Who Bugged Jiang Zemin's Airplane?,
NEWSMAX.COM, Jan. 25, 2002,
http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/l/25/12454.shtml ("Chinese
intelligence officials are concerned that the Chinese army may have planted
the surveillance devices. Twenty Chinese air force officers are being
questioned on suspicion of negligence and corruption, and two officials from
the China Aviation Supplies Export and Import Corporation are in Chinese
custody.").
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assumption that the intelligence community was attempting
espionage by placing tireless, soundless, virtually formless
electronic spies inside Zemin's aircraft. Ultimately, whether the
U.S. was responsible for this attempted espionage is immaterial to
raising the issue that the aircraft bugging could have been the
implementation of a foreign intelligence gathering technique. 12
If U.S. intelligence agencies sponsored the technical
modification of the airplane before it was exported to China, why
then might the Chinese, or some other foreign power, not seek to
plant similar information-gathering technologies - technical
devices or software which capture data and transmit it through
the internet to other information systems designed to receive and
cache the data 13 - into host products exported to the U.S.? It is
well known that the Chinese government sponsors web and
internet-based attacks on Western information infrastructures,
attempting to find gaps in information security defenses in order
to exploit information.' 4 As FBI Director Robert Mueller noted in
12. See Cao Xueyi, The Wolf Has Come, PLA DAILY (MEDIA PRODUCT OF
THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY), Aug. 25, 1999, at 5, available at
http://www.usembassy-china.org.cn/sandt/secwolf.html (recognizing the
potential for Chinese information system security breaches: "[E]ighty
percent of computer security problems are caused by management errors.
Computer spies take advantage of these errors. They use electromagnetic
sensors, bugs, or advanced network equipment to monitor a computer's CPU,
peripherals, terminals, communications equipment and network information.
Making use of electromagnetic reflections, information and images on a
computer system can be captured remotely using appropriate electronic
equipment. Using various direct and indirect pathways, they enter Chinese
military computer systems, steal information and damage systems or use
computer viruses to change computer data. This can affect the entire
computer system and cause a failure.").
13. The technology and skill set involved for some information system
intrusion activities may not be particularly sophisticated.. See, e.g., Andrea
Estes & Tracy Jan, Boston Latin Teen is Accused of Hacking, BOSTON GLOBE,
Apr. 29, 2006, at Al; Robert Burns, Pentagon Hacker Compromises Personal
Data, MILITARY.COM, Apr. 29, 2006, http://www.military.comNews
Content/0,13319,95760,00.html.
14. See China Says Hacking Illegal, After Alleged Military Attacks on
U.S. Computers, FORBES.COM, Dec. 13, 2005, http://www.forbes.com/work/
feeds/afx/2005/12/13/afx2387405.html; Frederick W. Stakelbeck, Jr., The
Approaching Chinese Cyber Storm, FRONTPAGEMAGAZINE.COM,
http://www.frontpagemag. com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=18870 (last
visited Mar. 2, 2007) ("[I]t is easy to understand why national security
questions still resonate in Washington from the December purchase of IBM's
PC division by China's largest computer company Lenovo. Although
2007] TECHNICALLY-BASED ESPIONAGE THREAT 837
testimony before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence,
The cyber-threat to the U.S. is serious and continues to
expand rapidly the number of actors with both the ability
and the desire to utilize computers for illegal and harmful
purposes rises.
Cyber threats stems from both state actors, including
foreign governments that use their vast resources to
develop cyber technologies with which to attack our
networks, and non-state actors such as terrorist groups
and hackers that act independently of foreign
governments. The increasing number of foreign
governments and non-state actors exploiting U.S.
computer networks is a major concern to the FBI and the
Intelligence Community as a whole.
State actors continue to be a threat to both our national
security as well as our economic security because they
have the technical and financial resources to support
advanced network exploitation and attack. The greatest
cyber threat is posed by countries that continue to openly
conduct computer network attacks and exploitations on
American systems.' 5
Moreover, the recent acquisition by Chinese computer
manufacturer Lenovo of IBM's personal computer division 16 has
eventually approved by the Committee on Foreign Investments in the United
States (CFIUS), critical questions concerning the ultimate use of the
company's state-of-the-art computers as they relate to state-sponsored cyber
crime and hacking attacks, still remain largely unanswered."); Jay Lyman,
Report: U.S. Expecting Chinese Hack Blitz, NEWSFACTOR MAG., Apr. 25, 2002,
http://www.newsfactor.com/
perl]story/17465.html; Peter Warren, Smash and Grab, the Hi-tech Way, THE
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Jan. 19, 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/china/story/
0,,1689181,00.html.
15. Global Threats to the U.S. and the FBI's Response, Hearing Before the
S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 109th Cong. (2005) (testimony of Robert S.
Mueller III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress05/mueller021605.htm).
16. See Steve Lohr, Is I.B.M.'s Lenovo Proposal a Threat to National
Security?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2005, at C6 ("Most I.B.M. personal computers
are now produced in China. Like other PC's, the I.B.M. machines are powered
by Intel microprocessors and are assembled with chips and parts made
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given rise to suspicion within the U.S. 17 Obviously, some foreign-
made and foreign-modified information technology products,
including hardware and software, 18 make their way into the U.S.
stream of commerce, including to U.S. government use,
particularly by the military, the Departments of Defense and
State, other departments and agencies, the intelligence agencies
themselves, the Executive Office of the President, and Congress.
The scenarios of concern are:
* That a foreign manufacturer is infiltrated
around the world, though mainly in East Asia ... [T]he Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States, a multiagency group, will carry out
a formal investigation, which is expected to last 45 days, people close to the
inquiry have confirmed ... Some members of the foreign investment
committee, according to people close to the inquiry, have raised questions
about whether the sale of I.B.M.'s PC business to Lenovo may increase the
potential for industrial espionage and the transfer of technology for possible
military uses, given that the Chinese government owns a large stake of
Lenovo.").
17. Chinese Computer Maker Is Open To Inquiry on Sale to State
Department, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2006, at C2; Keith Bradsher, State
Department is Criticized for Purchasing Chinese PCs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24,
2006, at C5; Lenovo Under U.S. Probe for Spying, SLASHDOT.ORG, Mar. 30,
2006, http://it.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=06/ 03/30/1344211 ('Lenovo, the
giant Chinese PC manufacturer, is under a probe by the U.S.-China
Economic Security Review Commission (USCC) for possible bugging.
Apparently, the [U.S.] government has ordered 16,000 PCs from Lenovo but
is now requesting that Lenovo be investigated by intelligence agencies. The
fear is of foreign intelligence applying pressure to Lenovo to equip its PCs so
that the U.S. can be spied on. ... 'Despite the probe, Lenovo says that its
international business, especially those that deal with the U.S., follow strictly
laid out government regulations and rules. Lenovo also claims that even after
purchasing IBM's PC division, its international business has not been
affected negatively. Interestingly, in an interview with the BBC, Lenovo
mentioned that an open investigation or probe may negatively affect the way
that the company deals with future government contracts or bids."').
18. See Joseph Kahn, Chinese Leader Focuses on Business as 4-Day U.S.
Visit Begins in Washington State, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2006, at A8
("Microsoft, which gave [current Chinese President Hu Jintao] a tour of a
hyper-technological home of the future, was reaping the rewards of a new
regulation requiring all Chinese-made computers to preinstall a copyrighted
operating system to prevent piracy.
In the past two weeks, Microsoft has signed four agreements with
Chinese computer manufacturers to preinstall Windows. The largest
came Monday, when [Chinese government-owned] Lenovo Group said it
would spend $1.2 billion over the next year on Windows."). The potential
for Chinese modification of the Windows program for economic and
security-related espionage purposes is apparent.
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unknowingly by agents of a foreign power, who insert,
undetected, microhardware or undetectable computer
code into products destined for U.S. markets and U.S.
government purchase and use;
" A foreign manufacturer is deliberately complicit is the
same scheme;
" A U.S. domestic company is infiltrated or willfully
complicit in such a scheme;
" A U.S. company, or a controlling interest in a U.S.
company, is acquired by a foreign entity and its
manufacturing, assembly and distribution processes
are corrupted by the foreign entity; or,
" A U.S. domestic company unknowingly integrates
adulterated components manufactured or assembled
abroad into a product destined for U.S. government
purchase and use.
"Buy American" is an obvious, yet wholly unworkable,
solution: in the era of integrated economies, particularly in
information systems, it is virtually impossible for a U.S.
manufacturer to use only wholly domestic components in its final
product 19 - not to mention the practically unavoidable WTO
proceedings alleging protectionism that would follow - and even
then, infiltration by foreign agents posing as researchers or
technical workers presents a continuing vulnerability. For
example, the virtually ubiquitous Blackberry communications
device is manufactured by Research in Motion, Inc.,20 in Waterloo,
Ontario, Canada,2 ' and Amkor Technology, Incorporated, a
Chandler, Arizona corporation producing components for cell
phones, personal computers, and other products,22 has major
19. See generally DAVID G. MCKENDRICK, RICHARD F. DONER, & STEPHAN
HAGGARD, FROM SILICON VALLEY TO SINGAPORE: LOCATION AND COMPETITIVE
ADVANTAGE IN THE HARD DISK DRIVE INDUSTRY (2000).
20. See Research in Motion, available at
http://www.rim.com/company/index.shtml (follow "Products" hyperlink) (last
visited Mar. 2, 2007).
21. See Research in Motion, available at
http://www.rim.com/company/index.shtml (follow "Company" hyperlink) (last
visited Mar. 2, 2007).
22. See Amkor (China), http://www.amkor.com/contact/index.cfm (last
visited Mar. 2, 2007).
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manufacturing facilities in Pudong, Shanghai, China. 23 Intel, Inc.,
a leading manufacturer of computer chips, motherboards, and
other information system components integrated into the products
of virtually every major information systems manufacturer, 24 has
employees in 45 countries, 25 manufacturing facilities in China26
and Malaysia 27 and research and development facilities in
Russia, 28 and performs a "substantial majority" of component
assembly and testing in Costa Rica, China, Malaysia, and the
Philippines. 29 Avoiding foreign technology is simply not possible
in the integrated world economy.
By borrowing from the American legal concept of products
liability, in which the burden of designing harmless products and
bearing risk regarding to the safety of a product's design and
manufacture is shifted onto companies rather than consumers, the
law can impose special duties on companies engaged in
information technology commerce aimed at U.S. consumers,
including the U.S. government, and can require them to take
prudent steps mandated by law to ensure that the products they
sell are as "espionage-safe" as possible. Companies engaged in the
enterprises of manufacturing, assembling, and distributing
information systems components simply are in a better position
than the U.S. government or other end users to prevent the
adulteration of their products. First, companies can use trusted
agents to verify the quality control of their products to ensure no
espionage-enabling parasitic technology is emplaced. Moreover,
companies have a knowledge advantage regarding the engineering
23. See Amkor (China), http://www.amkor.com/services/assembly-
services/china.cfm (last visited Mar. 2, 2007).
24. See Intel Products, http://www.intel.com/products (last visited Mar. 2,
2007).
25. See Intel, Corporate Governance & Social Responsibility,
http://www.intel.com/intel/finance/gcr03/06-everywhere-matters.htm (last
visited Mar. 2, 2007).
26. See Intel in Your Community: China,
http://www.intel.com/community/china (last visited Mar. 2, 2007).
27. See Jobs at Intel, Malaysia, http://www.intel.com/jobs/malaysia (last
visited Mar. 2, 2007).
28. See Jobs at Intel, Russia, http://www.intel.com/jobs/russia (last
visited Mar. 2, 2007).
29. See Intel Global Citizenship Report 2003,
http://www.intel.com/intel/finance/gcr03/06.everywhere-matters.htm (last
visited Mar. 2, 2007).
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and production processes of their own products.
In short, companies can be economically incentivized, through
legal sanction, to take prudent steps to ensure that products sold
to the U.S. government and entering the stream of U.S. commerce
are "espionage-safe." The burden should fall on the party on
whose "watch" the vulnerability is introduced; that is, if a
company allows, deliberately or negligently, a monitoring or
surveillance device to be engrafted onto its product, why should
the burden of discovery lie with the customer? Such a construct is
as inconsistent with basic notions of commercial fairness as
requiring a homeowner who purchases a new lawnmower to
ascertain for himself whether the mower is safe to operate: such
burdens, in the American legal tradition, fall to the supplier of the
purchased commodity. What is required is not excluding foreign
products from the U.S. stream of commerce that ends with
government purchase and use, but rather a set of law-based,
economic incentives that require producers to regulate, police, and
monitor their own operations to ensure they are selling "pure"
(unadulterated, or "espionage-safe" products) to the U.S.
government and in U.S. markets. But just as the fact that the
manufacturer of the lawn mower has the burden of designing a
safe product, the consumer is not relieved of the burden of wearing
safety equipment in case of a failure in the manufacturer's design
or quality control process that results in a catastrophic failure of
the product and potential injury. Prudent counterespionage policy
also requires a failsafe process on the U.S. end of the transaction
to verify the efforts of the supplying companies, by assessing risk
posed by foreign acquisitions of domestic business organizations
and by detecting the existence of technically-based espionage
devices or apparatus that slip through the company's processes, in
order to manage and apportion risk.3 0
30. One additional method of managing risk, beyond the scope of this
writing, is to ensure that no manufacturer has the ability of controlling the
destination or end user of particular units of information technology
products, and to ensure that a marginal percentage of one company's
products are used in applications involving classified, sensitive, or
proprietary information. For example, U.S. law might limit U.S. purchases of
Lenovo computers to 2% of Lenovo's annual unit product; in the absence of
any other controls or factors, this would limit to 2% the likelihood that an
adulterated information systems product would be used to process or store
sensitive U.S. information or data. Second, the ultimate end-user of any
842 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 12:832
The issue for analysis, then, is what legal authorities and
counterintelligence processes currently exist that can be used,
adapted, modified, or amended to counter, through detection and
deterrence, technical espionage threats present in goods, such as
computers, routers, servers, switches, or mobile phones (host
products), manufactured (in whole or in part) or assembled and
imported from abroad (both in China and in third countries where
Chinese or Chinese-controlled manufacturers are present), used
by the U.S. government and the U.S. stream of commerce in the
processing and dissemination of classified, sensitive, or U.S.-
proprietary information? In more simple terms, how do we use
the tools in our kit to stop China from spying on us using our own
systems?
I propose a combination of legal processes and information
security practices to counter this potential manifestation of a very
real threat. Essentially, the modifications and interpretations of
law advocated herein shift the onus to the market -
manufacturers, assemblers, and distributors - to self-police, to
work proactively to control their manufacturing, assembly, and
distribution processes to ensure their products are not used in
espionage-related activities, while effecting risk-minimization
measures. The approach is twofold: prevention through detection
and deterrence, and punishment through detection and
prosecution:
* Use of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizatidns (RICO) legal regime by the U.S.
particular technology could be protected from disclosure by using a
contracting strawman through which all purchases must pass; for example, if
the U.S. Departments of State, Defense and Justice (which routinely deal in
classified information) funneled all their computer purchases through a
single clearinghouse, along with the Departments of Agriculture, Interior,
Housing and Urban Development, etc. (which do not typically deal in
classified media), then the ultimate destination of any particular computer
system would be shielded from the supplier, and a corrupted supplier would
not know which computer unit to "bug." Diluting purchases into a larger
government pool would manage risk by reducing the likelihood that a
particular organ of government could have its systems deliberately targeted.
This may be a recipe for supply chain failure - I take no position on the cost
in efficiency of structuring such a purchasing system - but offer it as a
counterespionage technique. The price in efficiency may be too costly to
realize a relatively marginal gain in information security; this is a technical
issue that invites study by an appropriate government agency.
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Department of Justice to punish, or obtain civil
remedies for, espionage by foreign business
enterprises, or domestic companies with foreign
subsidiaries, and modifying the definition of
"espionage" in the racketeering statute to include
deliberate or negligent inclusion of, or failure to
exclude, espionage-enabling devices, apparatus, or
computer code into a product bound for U.S. markets.
o This approach pushes the bounds of anti-
criminal enterprise law, prompting Congress to
tweak the RICO and espionage statutes to
allow the courts to reach business enterprises
engaged or involved in espionage, and to force
the federal courts to confront RICO's utility
against novel criminally-organized activity,
including enterprises designed or recruited to
commit espionage, or those which passively, or
through willful ignorance, permit their
products to be engineered or modified to serve
as instruments of espionage.
o RICO criminal penalties can affect the share
price of publicly traded companies, and civil
remedies can result in seizures of cash and
property belonging to the companies engaged
in the RICO enterprise - providing a market-
based, economic incentive for companies to
ensure their products are not modified or
altered to enable espionage by foreign powers,
or the agents of foreign powers.
Reforming the Exon-Florio statutory framework
underlying the U.S. Department of the Treasury's
Committee on Foreign Investments in the United
States (CFIUS), incorporating the Intelligence
Community Acquisition Risk Center (CARC) into the
CFIUS structure, and emplacing new responsibilities
on the Defense Technology Security Administration.
o With regard to CFIUS, streamlining the
committee's organization, function, and
leadership, with a view toward making it a
more effective tool against acquisition of U.S.
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business interests. by foreign entities that
might use the newly-acquired U.S. business to
enable espionage by causing or permitting the
adulteration of information system
manufacturing, assembly and distribution
processes.
o Strengthening CFIUS's investigative resources
and remedial powers, particularly with regard
to companies, foreign or domestic, potentially
engaged in, supporting, or conducting
espionage or espionage-related activities.
o Other techniques might include:
" Prescribing drastic civil remedies, such
as divestment or liquidated damages
against companies whose products do
not pass rigid inspections mandated by
statute or Executive Order.
" Establishment of an aggressive
inspection regime of a representative
sample of all computers and
information system components
manufactured,. modified, or assembled
abroad, designed to detect engineered
software and software vulnerabilities
designed to. provide access for
espionage-related purposes.
o Like the RICO economic incentivization, this
practice would shift the burden to private
companies:
" To ensure that they engineer
counterespionage protections into their
manufacturing and shipping processes;
" To ensure that personnel are properly
screened for trustworthiness and
loyalty; and
" To ensure that products are inspected
and tested before delivery to U.S.
Government customers, because
discovery of a national security risk in
company's products could, and should,
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lead to decertification by CFIUS and
judicial orders to the parent company to
divest - an expensive proposition.
Several key assumptions underlie the analysis herein:
1. That China or other foreign powers have the desire to
acquire foreign intelligence, both security-related and
economic intelligence, from the U.S.
2. That China or other foreign powers have the
technological capacity to create or manufacture
technical espionage devices, apparatus, or computer
code of the type required to capture and transmit
information to the receiving foreign entity
clandestinely;
3. That China or other foreign powers have the
analytical capacity to turn massive volumes of raw
data captured from U.S. systems into useful
intelligence, beneficial to the foreign power's security
or economy, to the detriment of U.S. security and
economy;
4. That devices or code, once inserted into products
bound for U.S. consumption and use, generally are
difficult, but usually not impossible, to detect;
5. That these devices, apparatus, or code would be
detected more easily during the manufacturing,
assembly, and/or distribution processes, than after the
finished host equipment has entered the U.S. stream
of commerce; and,
6. That China or some other foreign power attempting to
effect technically-based espionage, could not control or
dictate the destination, or end-user, of the adulterated
host equipment, and could not ensure that adulterated
host equipment is not directed toward certain "target"
consumers, such as the CIA, Department of State,
Department of Defense, FBI, or certain Congressional
committees.
III. RICO AND ESPIONAGE ENTERPRISES
The Racketeering and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) legal
regime defines as criminal conduct - and provides civil remedies
against RICO-related property related to - organizing, operating,
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and profiting from a criminal enterprise. Originally borne from
the U.S. campaign against organized crime, specifically
established Mafiosi criminal syndicates engaged in traditional
criminal activities such as extortion, drug trafficking, protection
rackets, usurious and unregulated lending, theft, and gambling,
RICO has been found applicable in a wide variety of contexts,
including use not only against conventional organized crime, but
also against urban drug gangs, mail and wire fraud schemes, and
corrupt business practices, and even government civil actions
against the tobacco industry. 31 Its utility may not be limited to
ordinary criminal enterprises such as new Central American-
influenced gang activity32 that replaced the Italian and Sicilian
mafia and Irish mobs that RICO originally was enacted to combat,
but might be extended or modify to include terrorism 33 and
31. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F. Supp 2d 131, 134
(D.D.C. 2000). Use of the statute against the Catholic Church has even been
proposed by some activist commentators for the organization's alleged
complicity in concealing sexual offenses by priests against minors. See Marci
Hamilton, It's Time For A RICO Prosecution of the Catholic Church, FINDLAw
WRIT, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20030619.html (last visited
Mar. 2, 2007). At least one such case has been filed. Rod Dreher, Mitered in
the Mob?, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Mar. 28, 2002, http://www.national
review.com/dreher/dreher032802.asp (last visited Mar. 2, 2007).
32. See Jim Kouri, Using RICO to Bag Illegal Alien Gangsters, AM.
CHRON., Aug. 17, 2005, http://
www.americanchronicle.com/articles/viewArticle.asp?articlelD= 1928; Press
Release, FBI Announces Coordinated Law Enforcement Action Against
Gangs (Sept. 8, 2005), http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressre105/ms-13operation
090805.htm.
33. See Robert Weisberg, RICO Suave - Using Federal Racketeering Law
to Prosecute al-Qaida, SLATE: JURISPRUDENCE,
http://www.slate.com/id/2067848 (last visited Mar. 2, 2007) ("Using RICO,
prosecutors could handily present the jury with a package of dots pre-
connected by congressional mandate. Because under RICO, it may not
matter whether Moussaoui helped plan crimes, so long as he lent moral
support to an organization.
RICO was first conceived as a tool to prosecute organized crime, most
obviously the Mafia. And its key component lay in assuming the existence of
an "enterprise" that crooks manipulated for illegal ends. In the original
conception of RICO, this enterprise was a legitimate organization - usually a
corporation or labor union - and the crooks committed a RICO violation by
laundering criminal profits through or investing them in the enterprise, or by
using the otherwise good offices of the enterprise to commit illegal acts. The
"act" of racketeering thus simply consists of an individual committing at least
two "predicate acts" within 10 years in a manner somehow tied to the
enterprise, and those predicate acts can be just about any act constituting a
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espionage activities - particularly since RICO's express purpose,
essentially, was to criminalize organizing an enterprise to commit
criminal offenses.
Terrorist and espionage networks fit the general RICO
criminal enterprise category squarely on their faces. For example,
where a company permits its manufacturing, assembly or
distribution processes to become corrupted by foreign agents,
permitting agents to place listening devices or computer code
enabling capture, packaging, and transmittal of information or
data, the criminal enterprise cognizable under modified-RICO
would consist of the company, including its officers, the foreign
agent, and the foreign power for whom the agent is acting.
Moreover, where two or more actors within the company -
particularly actors with "control group" or managerial
responsibilities within the company whose actions can be imputed
to the company - engage in a pattern of racketeering activity, the
company itself might constitute the enterprise. In fact, "courts
have found that public entities and governmental agencies, as well
as private entities, can constitute RICO enterprises. For example,
the term 'enterprise' has been found to encompass private
businesses, sole proprietor-ships, corporations, labor
organizations, schools, county prosecutors' offices, marriages, and
other 'associations in fact.' 34
A. History of the RICO Statute
The RICO statute35 was passed in 1970 with the specific aim
of providing a federal statutory framework for attacking organized
crime under state or federal law. ... Moreover, the enterprise need not have a
pecuniary goal - a shared ideology is fine, so long as the racketeering activity
meets the trivially easy test of affecting interstate commerce. The
government can now map the concept of an enterprise onto almost any kind
of criminal organization, call it a RICO enterprise, then prosecute anyone
working for that enterprise of a RICO violation ...
[C]alling al-Qaeda a RICO enterprise would add color to an already dramatic
case and it might just help the government sprinkle the magical federal
conspiracy dust on an even wider group of characters. Congress has supplied
a special instrument to combat large, conspiratorial organizations; the
government should try to sell it to jurors.)
34. Michele Sacks, Thomas Coale, & Lara Goldberg, Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 825, 836 (2005).
35. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1970).
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crime organizations. The statute's "secret weapons" are civil
proceedings against property acquired in connection with the
enterprise, and enhanced criminal punishment - for simply
organizing into a criminal business unit to accomplishing criminal
enterprise, or "racketeering activity," some of which, by statutory
definition, frequently consists of traditional state crimes, on the
theory that such a business organization injures interstate
commerce. The statute's preliminary 'Statement of Finding and
Purpose' declares that "[iut is the purpose of [RICO] to seek the
eradication of organized crime in the United States by
strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by
establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced
sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of
those engaged in organized crime," 36 a purpose that Congress may
embrace through minor modification of the statute to redefine
espionage and encompass organized espionage enterprises.
The RICO statute defines "racketeering activity" as state law
felonies such as murder, kidnapping, arson, gambling, robbery,
bribery, extortion, obscenity, and controlled substances, as well as
a wide variety of specific federal offenses, such as mail fraud, wire
fraud, obstruction of justice, witness tampering, trafficking in
various contraband, and other frauds relating generally to
interstate commerce. 37 It essentially prohibits maintenance of an
ownership or management interest in an enterprise engaged in
racketeering activity; profiting from or participating in the
activities from such an enterprise; and conspiring to violate these
prohibitions - in other words, however "racketeering activity" is
defined (a term which definition has been regularly expanded by
Congress), RICO "merely imposes additional liability on those who
commit certain offenses repeatedly.'38 The statute, as worded,
does not plainly touch espionage-related activities, except,
possibly, on a fact-dependent basis:
1. Through a hyper-aggressive reading of the federal
36. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat.
922, 923 (1970).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1961.
38. Cecil Greek, Is This the End of RICO? Or Only the Beginning? The
Ongoing Debate Over the Expanded Use of Criminal and Civil RICO, 19 FREE
INQUIRY IN CREATIVE SOCIOLOGY 11, May 1991, available at
http://www.fsu.edu/-crimdo/rico.html (emphasis added).
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wire fraud statute as a component of RICO-prohibited
activity;39
2. Possibly in connection with mail fraud40 (if the mail is
used in connection with the espionage activity); or
3. By invoking the access devices fraud provision.41
Each of these prohibitions only arguably would reach
espionage activities, and probably only in certain circumstances.
A much safer bet to ensure the law's reach would be to engraft an
espionage component into the definition of "racketeering."
39. The federal wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. §1343 (Supp. IV 2004),
states:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or
artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises,
transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or
television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any
writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of
executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
The government would have to stretch the definition to a near-
implausible degree, that wire fraud is constituted by modifying
computers as instruments of espionage which are then sold or
delivered to the U.S. government, making the U.S. government the
wire fraud victim. In such a reading, the fraudulent activity element
is that the government paid full value for and received a product
designed or engineered to act contrary to its interests, or, in any
case, a product not identical to the goods intended to be purchased.
This argument assumes that wire transmissions were utilized at
some point during the transaction, such as email messages to
coordinate the sale, telephone calls, electronic transmission of
payment documents, etc.
40. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Supp. IV. 2004). Like the wire fraud provision,
invoking this provision to reach espionage, however, would require framing
the espionage activity as somehow defrauding the targeted recipient of the
goods.
41. 18 U.S.C. §1029 (2000). This provision prohibits fraud against
telecommunications service providers by modifying devices or software. It is
probably inapplicable to technically-based espionage activity, as the intent of
the statute is to prevent fraud, or, essentially, theft of services, not theft of
protected information.
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B. Fine-tuning and Utilizing RICO to Achieve Counterespionage
Benefits
1. Criminal Enterprise Liability
With minor modification - by inserting "espionage
activities '42 into § 1961(1) of the RICO statute, and defining this
term elsewhere in the statute, such as by inserting a definition at
§ 1961(11) - prosecutors could rely on Congress' instructions to the
courts to interpret RICO liberally43 to reach espionage enterprises,
including corporations who allow their products, through design or
by neglect, to become corrupted with espionage instruments -
particularly those corporations whose components are
manufactured or assembled overseas. "Espionage activity" could
be defined as "an act, communication, or failure to act to prevent
an act or communication, the purpose of which is to effect the
compromise of classified information [as defined in classified
information protection statutes], government proprietary
information, or commercial proprietary information [as defined in
the Economic Espionage Act], to a foreign power or agents of a
foreign power, including foreign states, organizations, or non-state
actors or enterprises, with the intent or foreseeable effect of
injuring national security." This wording, or some version of it,
would bring within RICO's reach deliberate acts of espionage, and
failures by companies supplying goods to the U.S. stream of
commerce and domestic customers, including the federal
government to protect their products from technically-based
espionage-enabling adulteration. Legislative drafters can
wordsmith the statute through a detailed analysis of leading
products liability standards, extracting the strict liability concepts
and applying them to the espionage statute, in order to impose, at
law, an affirmative duty on companies to control their business
processes to avoid the introduction of technical espionage devices,
apparatus, or code.44  The intent is to lower the degree of
42. This term should be defined in the statute with reference to Chapters
37 (Espionage and Censorship) and 90 (Protection of Trade Secrets) of Title
18, U.S. Code.
43. See 18 U.S.C. §1961 (2000) (ordering a liberal construction of its
provisions).
44. An exhaustive analysis of products liability legal standards and
adjustment of these articulated standards to apply to espionage activities is
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culpability required to be shown of companies introducing
adulterated information technology products into the U.S. stream
of commerce, in order to make them, essentially, involuntary
partners in the counterespionage enterprise, by requiring them to
monitor their manufacturing, assembly and distribution processes
with sufficient care to avoid application of the statute.
The statute is hardly legislatively untouchable: historically,
Congress has not been reluctant to modify RICO to bring more
activities within its reach: commentators Sacks, Coale, and
Goldberg note that
beyond the scope of this paper. For a primer on general products liability, see
Products Liability, http://www.law.cornell.
edu/wex/index.php/Products-liability (last visited May 10, 2006) ("Products
liability refers to the liability of any or all parties along the chain of
manufacture of any product for damage caused by that product. This includes
the manufacturer of component parts (at the top of the chain), an assembling
manufacturer, the wholesaler, and the retail store owner (at the bottom of the
chain). Products containing inherent defects that cause harm to a consumer
of the product, or someone to whom the product was loaned, given, etc., are
the subjects of products liability suits. While products are generally thought
of as tangible personal property, products liability has stretched that
definition to include intangibles (gas), naturals (pets), real estate (house), and
writings (navigational charts).
"Products liability claims can be based on negligence, strict liability, or
breach of warranty of fitness depending on the jurisdiction within which the
claim is based. Many states have enacted comprehensive products liability
statutes. These statutory provisions can be very diverse such that the United
States Department of Commerce has promulgated a Model Uniform Products
Liability Act (MUPLA) for voluntary use by the states. There is no federal
products liability law.
"In any jurisdiction one must prove that the product is defective. There are
three types of product defects that incur liability in manufacturers and
suppliers: design defects, manufacturing defects, and defects in marketing.
Design defects are inherent; they exist before the product is manufactured.
While the item might serve its purpose well, it can be unreasonably
dangerous to use due to a design flaw. On the other hand, manufacturing
defects occur during the construction or production of the item. Only a few
out of many products of the same type are flawed in this case. Defects in
marketing deal with improper instructions and failures to warn consumers of
latent dangers in the product.
"Products Liability is generally considered a strict liability offense. Strict
liability wrongs do not depend on the degree of carefulness by the defendant.
Translated to products liability terms, a defendant is liable when it is shown
that the product is defective. It is irrelevant whether the manufacturer or
supplier exercised great care; if there is a defect in the product that causes
harm, he or she will be liable for it.") (emphasis added).
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[i]n the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,
Congress extended the definition of "racketeering
activities" under RICO to include dealing in obscene
materials, as well as the non-reporting of currency and
foreign transactions. The Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 further extended the RICO
provisions to include various immigration crimes. 45
Other amendments since the statute's original enactment
include adding to the definition of racketeering activity trafficking
in stolen cigarettes, motor vehicles, and automotive parts, murder-
for-hire, sexual exploitation of children, money laundering,
witness tampering or retaliation, obstruction of justice, and
bankruptcy fraud.46 The political momentum backing security
concerns at present might be leveraged to convince Congress to
make such minor amendments to the statute to bring espionage,
by state-based agents or terrorists, within the reach of the potent
RICO provisions. Such a modification would effect an
enhancement of security at a very small price in civil liberties, in
that there is no civil right or liberty to be free from a RICO
prosecution where evidence shows complicity, deliberate or
otherwise, in espionage or espionage-related activities; moreover,
business organizations, as artificial legal constructs, do not
traditionally enjoy the same degree of fundamental civil liberties
as those exercised by natural persons. Burdening of a company in
the manner contemplated comes with no "liberty" price tag
attached, only a financial cost for the company to monitor more
closely its business operations.
2. Civil RICO Enforcement
Moreover, the statute provides a complimentary civil
component, which could be exercised in favor of the United States,
to "attack the economic roots of racketeering activities. '47 Not
only is the Attorney General granted specific authority to bring
actions in equity to enjoin or judicially limit the operation of an
unlawful RICO enterprise and order civil forfeitures, requiring
45. Sacks, Coale, & Goldberg, supra note 34, at 830 (citations omitted).
46. See 18 U.S.C. §1961.
47. Sacks, Coale, & Goldberg, supra note 34, at 857.
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disgorgement of all proceeds of the enterprise,48 the U.S.
Government itself may pursue legal, compensatory remedies
against the enterprise, where the government is the damaged
party.49 Section 1964(c) of the RICO statute permits any "person"
injured to sue in federal court to recover treble damages based on
economic injury sustained, plus attorney's fees and litigation
expenses. 50 "Person" is defined in the statute as "any individual
or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in
property."51 The government is clearly an "entity" within a plain
language meaning of that word - "a thing with distinct and
independent existence"52 - and the government certainly holds
legal title to billions of dollars worth of real property, goods, and
chattels.
Where the government could show an injury to its pecuniary
interest or property, an amended "espionage RICO" does not
preclude the government from recovering money from the
corporation, even a foreign corporation, supplying the espionage-
engineered systems.53 Either theory of recovery of ill-gotten RICO
proceeds through civil forfeitures would work as a powerful
incentive to business organizations to "espionage-proof' their
48. 18 U.S.C. §1964(a) (2000)("The district courts of the United States
shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of
this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, including, but not limited to:
ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any
enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or
investments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any
person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged
in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering
dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due provision for the
rights of innocent persons."); see also Marian R. Williams, 27 CRIM. JUST. REV.
321, 322-23 (2002) (noting that government entities retain 100% of all assets
forfeited through civil actions).
49. See 18 U.S.C. §1964(c).
50. Id.
51. 18 U.S.C. §1961(3).
52. COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY,
http://www.askoxford.com/concise-oed/entity?view=uk (last visited April 29,
2006).
53. See, e.g., Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1420-21 (9th Cir.
1995); In re First Am. Corp., No. M8-85 (RWS), 1998 WL 148421, at *1-2
(S.D.N.Y. 1998); First Am. Corp. v. Price Waterhouse L.L.P., 988 F. Supp.
353, 364-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); United States v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg),
S.A., 980 F. Supp. 496, 500-05 (D.D.C. 1997); First Am. Corp. v. Al-Nahyan,
948 F. Supp. 1107, 1108 (D.D.C. 1996).
854 ROGER WILLLAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 12:832
manufacturing and distribution processes, shifting the burden to
companies to ensure their products are not modified by employees
or agents of foreign governments or non-state actors, such as
foreign organized crime syndicates or transnational terrorists.
3. Application and Benefits of Reaching Espionage Activities
Through RICO
In addition to extending personal criminal prosecutions and
civil liability to culpable company executives proven to have been
complicit in the decision to modify information technology
products as instruments of espionage, RICO is capable, with
minor modification, of reaching the business organization itself,
such as the computer manufacturing corporation Lenovo, or other
similarly situated corporations, companies or partnerships.
Again, "person" is defined in the statute as "any individual or
entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in
property,"54  and "enterprise" includes "any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and
any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a
legal entity."55 This broad definition of "person" sweeps in natural
persons, trusts, and various forms of business organization,
including partnerships and corporations - which meet the dual
criteria of "legal entity" and "capable of owning property."
The statutory definition of "enterprise," however, also would
need minor tweaking, as the term "any union or group of
individuals associated in fact" would probably require modification
to "any union or group of individuals and/or entities associated in
fact. ' 56 This would enable RICO to reach a corporation or other
legal "person" by virtue of participating in' the espionage
"association in fact" enterprise, but only where the definition of
enterprise is expanded to include a foreign government - an entity
- as "partner" to the corporation's legal personality. Neither the
foreign government nor the business organization is an
54. 18 U.S.C. §1961(3) (emphasis added).
55. 18 U.S.C. §1961(4).
56. Reply Brief of Petitioner at 1, Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Williams, 126 S.
Ct. 2016 (2006) (No. 05-465) ("RICO is aimed at the misuse of a distinct
'enterprise.' Indeed, the statutory limitations make plain that only
individuals - not an ad-hoc grouping of a corporation and others - can form
an association-in-fact enterprise.")
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"individual" under any reading of the statute. Because the foreign
government is not an "individual" but could be considered an
"entity," the definition of "enterprise" should be adjusted to reach
the foreign government for the purpose of bringing the business
organization (not the foreign government) into RICO's
jurisdictional reach. 57 Criminal proceedings against a company-
defendant can cripple the company's economic worth and
essentially drive it out of business by making the company's
shares valueless, 58 another robust enticement for companies to
ensure their products are not involved in the business of spying.
In sum, by forcing the companies to self-police their products
against espionage-related corruption in the manufacturing,
assembly, and distribution processes, U.S. counterintelligence
efforts can be augmented by companies seeking to do business
with the U.S. government or, in the case of economic espionage,
with U.S. business organizations.
Assuming Congress acts to bring espionage activities within
the definition of "racketeering,"59 RICO permits the introduction
of a broad range of evidence to prove up the racketeering
conspiracy - transactions that would be not relevant to proving a
predicate criminal offense within the range of offenses included in
57. The concept of expanding the jurisdiction of RICO through
interpretation of the definitions is not without controversy. See Toni Locy,
Court is Asked to Expand Racketeering Law's Reach, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 27,
2006, available at
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2006/04/27/court is_
askedto-expand_ racketeering-lawsjreach (noting comments by Justices
during oral argument supportive of the petitioner's position and probing the
wisdom of expanding the definition of "enterprise" in the RICO statute
beyond what Congress clearly intended to proscribe.).
58. See Arthur Andersen L.L.P. v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 701-02
(2005); Marcia Hughes, No Accounting for Greed, BBC NEWS, July 23, 2002,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2147095.stm (noting that the
conviction of the company and subsequent barring from auditing work by the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission spelled the end of Arthur
Andersen as a business organization).
59. "Racketeering" is an elastic concept that has an ordinary usage
relating to organized crime but which, like any term in a statute, is
susceptible to modification by a clearly expressed intention of Congress.
Much academic and judicial criticism has been made of government attempts
to shoehorn more and more conduct into the existing definition of
racketeering; in order to avoid such criticism, Congress should act to redefine
the term to remove ambiguity regarding whether racketeering includes
espionage-related activity.
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the definition of "racketeering," could be used to paint the broader
picture of the enterprise. By charging espionage-enabling
engineering modifications in products sold to the U.S. as RICO
espionage racketeering, the government could bring to the light of
day the actions of a whole litany of actors whose actions might
otherwise not be provable in an ordinary criminal trial, such as
the acts of minor unindicted co-conspiratorial participants in the
enterprise whose conduct might be ruled not legally relevant to
establishing the principal espionage case. Finally, RICO counts in
an indictment would enable the government to add twenty years
of confinement punishment to the sentence upon conviction for
espionage and RICO violations, subject to U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines calculus. 60 Wielding RICO as a counterespionage tool
would enable the government to provide a more powerful
disincentive for companies to permit their employees or facilities
to be involved in technically-based espionage activities.
Finally, a corollary procedure would be useful to preventing
foreign influence over U.S. business organizations whose
manufacturing, assembly and distribution processes represent
opportunities for foreign powers to collect information in the first
place. Such a procedure could be effected by modifying the
legislative authority for the existence and functioning of the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).
IV. STRENGTHENING CFIUS AND CARC BY REFORMING EXON-FLORIO
A. CFIUS Background and the Dubai World Ports Controversy
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in U.S. markets has
historically been met with open arms. Foreign investment in U.S.
corporations or business organizations, however, has the potential
to compromise the companies to the detriment of U.S. national
security. With this in mind, Congress acted in Section 5021 of the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, amending the
Section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950,61 to provide a
review mechanism to the president, granting him the power to
forbid or mandate alterations to any purchase, merger, takeover,
60. See generally UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2005).
61. 64 Stat. 798 (1950), as amended, 50 U.S.C.App. § 2061 et seq. (1988
ed. and Supp. V),
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or controlling investment in a U.S. company when the transaction
is shown to be detrimental to U.S. national security.62 The Exon-
Florio statute empowered the president to establish CFIUS.
63
CFIUS most recently received extended press coverage over its
approval of the Dubai Ports World (Dubai World) port operations
deal, 64 in which Dubai World sought to purchase the U.K.
company Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
which held major port terminal operations contracts in the U.S.
The transaction would have given UAE government-owned Dubai
World "control of substantial operating functions at a number of
major East and Gulf Coast Ports, including New York, Newark,
Philadelphia, Baltimore, Miami, and New Orleans . .. [and would
acquire lesser, yet important, operating functions] at ports
including Portland [Maine], Boston, Davisville [Rhode Island],
Norfolk, Galveston, Houston, and Corpus Christi.' '6 5
The Dubai World transaction created a political hullabaloo.
CFIUS detractor Senator Paul Sarbanes' pointed out that the
committee's decision not even to refer the transaction for a
detailed, 45-day investigation constituted an egregious failure of
the body to function as designed, an oversight reminiscent of a
similar controversy in 2005, in which the Chinese government-
controlled China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)
attempted to acquire U.S. energy company Unocal.6 6 For some,
the threat to U.S. port security represented by the Dubai World
proposed transaction - which has attained a special level of
62. 50 U.S.C.App. § 2170(c) (1988)
63. See Exec. Order No. 11,858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20263 (May 9, 1975); Exec.
Order No. 12,661, 54 Fed. Reg. 779 (January 9, 1989); Exec. Order No.
12,860, 58 Fed. Reg. 47201 (Sept. 8, 1993).
64. See Press Release, CFIUS and the Protection of the National Security
in the Dubai Ports World Bid for Port Operations, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY, Feb. 24, 2006, available at http://www.treas.gov/press/
releases/js4071.htm (last visited April 30, 2006).
65. Continued Examination of Implementation of the Exon-Florio
Amendment: Focus on Dubai Ports World's Acquisition of P&O, U.S. Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2d Sess.
2006) (statement of Senator Paul Sarbanes) [hereinafter Sarbanes
statement].
66. See Ronald D. Lee & Nancy L. Perkins, Security U.S. Strategic Assets:
Does The Exon-Florio Statute Do Its Job, THE CHINA TRADE LAW REPORT -
ALM LAw JOURNAL NEWSLETTERS, Apr. 2006, available at
http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/issues/ljn_international/i_1/news/146
450-1.html (last visited May 10, 2006).
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sensitivity with regard to the role of port security in preventing
the introduction of a terrorist nuclear device inside U.S. borders67
- posed by this transaction was obvious, simply from the ethnic
(Arab) identify of one of the parties to the transaction. This is a
fairly clear case of ethnic profiling, against a company and a
government, rather than an individual or group of individuals,
that may or may not be supported by evidence regarding United
Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) government support to terrorism, 68 and
may or may not be justified or justifiable.69 But for almost
everyone, scrutiny of the functioning of CFIUS in the Dubai World
affair would be an important and valuable test case as to whether
CFIUS was functioning as designed, and as to whether the design
should be revised.
The Dubai port transaction press scrutiny highlighted
confusion in the general public, and provoked furor and
67. See generally U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT GAO 05-
466T, HOMELAND SECURITY: KEY CARGO SECURITY PROGRAMS CAN BE
IMPROVED (2005); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT GAO-03-770,
CONTAINER SECURITY: EXPANSION OF KEY CUSTOMS PROGRAMS WILL REQUIRE
GREATER ATTENTION TO CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS (2003).
68. But see REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS
UPON THE UNITED STATES (9/11 COMMISSION REPORT), MONOGRAPH ON
TERRORIST FINANCING, STAFF REPORT TO THE COMMISSION 6, (2004), available
at http://www.9-1lcommission.gov/staffstatements/91 1_TerrFinChl.pdf
(last visited May 3, 2006) ("The U.S. government had recognized the value of
enlisting the international community in efforts to stop the flow of money to
al Qaeda entities. U.S. diplomatic efforts had succeeded in persuading the
United Nations to sanction Bin Ladin economically, but such sanctions were
largely ineffective. Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E., necessary partners in any
realistic effort to stem the financing of terror, were ambivalent and
selectively cooperative in assisting the United States."). Political opposition
to U.A.E. investments in the U.S. may very well be an orchestrated
governmental signal to partners in the global war on terror that it really is
the world's largest economy that holds most of the cards - economic revenge
for U.A.E. foot-dragging on counterterrorism collaboration designed to
intimate the wisdom of cooperating with the U.S. strategic agenda.
69. One well-respected commentator posits that the possibility of that
strict scrutiny of equal protection challenges may yield permissible race-
based distinctions in wartime, because the depth and breadth of the
government's compelling need for security increases exponentially. See Mark
Tushnet, Emergencies and the Idea of Constitutionalism, in THE
CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY 39, 39
(Mark Tushnet ed., 2005) ("A race-based classification that would be
unconstitutional during peacetime might be constitutional during wartime,
not because the constitutional standards differ, but because their rational
application leads to different results.").
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grandstanding in Congress, 70 over how business transactions
dealing with "suspect states" (concern emerged over the fact that
the company, obviously based in Dubai, U.A.E. - an Arab state
known to produce terrorists 71 and suspected of complicity by some
70. H.J. Res. 79, 109th Cong. (2006) (Joint Resolution disapproving the
results of the review conducted by the Committee on Foreign Investment in
the United States (CFIUS) into the purchase of Peninsular and Oriental
Steam Navigation (P&O) by Dubai Ports World (DP World); S.J. Res. 32,
109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006) (Joint Resolution disapproving the results of the
review conducted by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States (CFIUS) into the purchase of Peninsular and Oriental Steam
Navigation (P&O) by Dubai Ports World).
71. As opposed, perhaps, to the U.S. and the U.K., both non-Arab states
known to produce terrorists. While the U.A.E.'s official position is one of
resolute support for the U.S. campaign against terrorism, see U.A.E. Foreign
Policy, http://uae-embassy.org/htmlpages/ForeignPolicy.htm ("In common
with the rest of the world, the United Arab Emirates found in the latter part
of 2001 that a major part of its foreign policy concerns was the international
campaign against terrorism that developed after the 11 September attacks
against Washington and New York. The U.A.E.'s condemnation of the
attacks, in which over 4000 people died, was swift and total.
'At this time of tragedy, our hearts are filled with sadness and compassion
for the victims of the terrible and criminal acts that took place in New York
and Washington ... and we send again our condolences to you, the people of
the United States and, in particular, the families of the victims,' Sheikh
Zayed told President Bush in a message shortly after the attacks.
"We have noted your wise, resolute and timely remarks about the necessity
for these tragic events not to be used as an excuse for, or reason for, any
attacks against or hostility towards Arab Americans or Americans of the
Muslim faith ... We share with you the belief that the acts ... are utterly
repugnant in the eyes of Islam, and we thank you for your timely and
appropriate statement, which so well reflects the values and traditions of the
United States as a land where neither racial origin nor religious beliefs is a
disqualification from full membership of the American nation ...
"[On] the occasion of the country's thirtieth National Day, Sheikh Zayed
added that: terrorism is the enemy of all humanity ... We support
international legitimacy in every action and measure that it takes to combat
terrorism and eradicate it and to close the way for terrorists ... Terrorism is
an international phenomenon that has no religion or race.
"The readiness of the United Arab Emirates to collaborate with the
international campaign against terrorism was quickly displayed....), the
government has been accused by some commentators of turning a blind eye to
terror financing through the U.A.E.. See id. ("In recognition of the fact that
the fight against terrorism required not only a military response, but also a
concerted effort to identify and eradicate its network of financial and other
links, the U.A.E. authorities responded rapidly to requests from the United
States to identify and freeze any bank accounts used by suspect individuals
and organizations. Although some evidence of suspect money transfers
through, rather than to, the U.A.E. were identified, an intensive review by
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in terrorist financing) are scrutinized by the U.S. government -
this, despite the absence of public domain information suggesting
that the transaction represented a national security liability. For
its part, the Bush administration seemed to be caught flatfooted
by the fact that the transaction had been approved, in fact, by two
organizations in his administration, and exercised executive
power to rescind the recommended approval by CFIUS and force
further scrutiny of the transaction.72  The response of the
government and the press to the transaction was an obvious
political defensive reaction, which resulted in Dubai World's
withdrawal of their offer for the acquisition. 73 This was due to a
the Central Bank failed to find any evidence of a major misuse of the
country's banking facilities.").
72. See Political Backlash Over Port Deal, CBS News, Feb. 22, 2006,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/ 2006/02/22/national/main1335774.shtml
(last visited May 10, 2006) ("If there is one thing Congressional leaders and
the White House can agree on, it is that neither knew the port deal with a
United Arab Emirates company was even in the works ... President Bush
was unaware of the pending sale of shipping operations at six major U.S.
seaports to a state-owned business in the United Arab Emirates until the
deal already had been approved by his administration ... Defending the deal
anew, the administration also said that it should have briefed Congress
sooner about the transaction, which has triggered a major political backlash
among both Republicans and Democrats.")
73. Jacob Freedman, Initial Hill Reaction Muted to New Dubai
Acquisition, CONG. Q., Apr. 28, 2006. ("The White House announced [today]
that President Bush has approved another sensitive U.S. acquisition by a
Dubai-owned company, but its careful handling of the review appears to have
averted the kind of public and congressional backlash that sank the DP
World ports transaction. The acquisition of British Doncasters Group Ltd. by
Dubai International Capital was subject to a full 45-day investigation by the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). The
administration notified several congressional committees when it began the
investigation and briefed them on its details. In contrast, approval of DP
World's acquisition of a British terminal operator with port operations in the
United States occurred without a detailed, 45-day security investigation.
Congress and senior administration officials [including the President] were
unaware of the deal until it was reported by the news media. After a public
uproar, DP World agreed to sell off its U.S. operations in the face of fierce
congressional opposition. Doncasters has several manufacturing plants in
the Georgia, Connecticut and other states that make precision parts for
aerospace and other industrial uses, both civilian and military ... as part of
the deal's approval, Dubai International Capital signed a binding agreement
that it would maintain uninterrupted supplies to the Department of
Defense....' There are two differences between this deal and the Dubai Ports
deal. First, this went through the process in a careful, thoughtful way; and
second, this is a product, not a service, and the opportunity to infiltrate and
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perception, accurate or erroneous, that CFIUS review was
conducted inadequately, which may reflect a lack of press and
Congressional understanding of the process. Or it may have
simply been an expedient political sitting duck, which allowed
political critics to score domestic "homeland security" points with
constituents, at substantial political cost to the Bush
administration and very little fiscal cost in FDI - the money
changed hands between the U.K. and the U.A.E. entities only.
Since the Dubai World fiasco, CFIUS has approved, and the
President has permitted to go forward, another sensitive
acquisition by a Dubai company, a subsidiary of Dubai Holding
LLC, of Ross Catherall US Holdings Inc. (Ross Catherall), a U.S.
subsidiary of British Doncasters Group that manufacturers
turbine fan parts and airfoils for military tanks and helicopters 74
- this time after a full, 45-day investigation and proper review. 75
Nevertheless, Congress has vowed to overhaul the CFIUS system
because of perceptions of defects in its design and operation. 76
Ensuring CFIUS functions effectively through legislative reform
will reap national security benefits generally by ensuring a careful
screening of foreign holdings of U.S. business enterprises.
Specifically, with regard to the Chinese technology-based
espionage threat, CFIUS review can mitigate or eliminate foreign
acquisition of U.S. business interests that would pave the way for
the introduction of espionage-enabling devices, apparatus, or code
into information technology host equipment destined for U.S
sabotage is both more difficult and more detectable,' [Senator Charles]
Schumer said. Congressional leaders have said that the CFIUS process
needs to be made more transparent, with a greater role for Congress. The
Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs committee approved a measure
on March 30 that would overhaul the foreign investment review process. On
the House side, Majority Whip Roy Blunt ... said Thursday that he will
introduce a bill by Memorial Day. Richard C. Shelby ... chairman of the
Senate committee, said in a statement Friday that he was 'encouraged to see
that the appropriate process was followed by CFIUS' in the Doncaster
transaction. But he said he remains 'committed to continue to press for an
overhaul of CFIUS to bring accountability, transparency and confidence to
the process."')
74. See Bush Approves Dubai Firm's Entry into U.S. Military Industry,
MIDDLE EAST TIMES, Apr. 30, 2006, http://www.metimes.com/articles/normal
.php?StoryID=20060501-041455-24772r.
75. See Statement by the Press Secretary, Apr. 28, 2006,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2006/04/20060428-3.html.
76. See Freedman, supra note 73; Sarbanes statement, supra note 65.
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consumption.
B. CFIUS Design, Legal Standards, and Operation
CFIUS is an interagency group chaired by the Department of
the Treasury, with the head of Treasury's Office of International
Investment serving as the Staff Chair,77 making CFIUS a largely
Treasury-centric show by virtue of the Department's capture of
the CFIUS leadership group. CFIUS enjoys representation from
the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Commerce, and
Homeland Security, as well as the Office of Management and
Budget, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, U.S.
Trade Representative, the Director of the Office of Science and
Technology Policy, the National Security Council, and the
Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and, occasionally,
depending on the nature of the transaction being reviewed, the
Departments of Energy and Transportation and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. 78 CFIUS is tasked with the mandate to
review the foreign acquisition of U.S. businesses or business
interests for national security impacts or concerns. 79
Exon-Florio provides certain standards against which CFIUS
review must be conducted in order to inform and enable the
President to act to suspend or prohibit foreign acquisition of a
U.S. company:
" Whether "[t]here is credible evidence that leads [the
President] to believe that the foreign investor might
take action that threatens to impair the national
security";80 and
" Whether "[e]xisting laws, other than the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the
Exon-Florio amendment itself, do not in his judgment
provide adequate and appropriate authority to protect
77. See Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, Mar. 2, 2006 (testimony of Robert M. Kimmitt,
Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of the Treasury) [hereinafter Kimmitt
testimony]; Testimony Before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee
on Armed Services, Mar. 2, 2006 (testimony of Clay Lowery, Assistant
Secretary (International Affairs), U.S. Department of the Treasury).
78. See Kimmitt testimony, supra note 77.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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the national security."'
The FY 1993 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1993 amended Exon-Florio, requiring an investigation where
"the acquirer is controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign
government and the acquisition "could result in control of a person
engaged in interstate commerce in the U.S. that could affect the
national security of the U.S. ' 82 This provision enabled CFIUS to
examine the proposed Dubai World transaction, which was
essentially an acquisition of a U.K. company by a UAE entity.
The U.S. connection was that the U.K. company, which employed
U.S. workers whose duty performance in port operations could
affect national security, was being acquired by another foreign
entity.
In conducting the national security review, the five factors for
consideration are:
1. domestic production needed for projected national
defense requirements;
2. the capability and capacity of domestic industries to
meet national defense requirements... ;
3. the control of domestic industries and commercial
activity by foreign citizens as it affects the capability
and capacity of the U.S. to meet the requirements of
national security;
4. the potential effects of the proposed or pending
transaction on sales of military goods, equipment, or
technology to a country that supports terrorism or
proliferates missile technology or chemical, [nuclear],
and biological weapons; and
5. the potential effects of the proposed or pending
transaction on U.S. international technological
81. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1977). The statute delegates authority to the
President to take extraordinary measures during wartime or times of
national emergency to deal with "unusual and extraordinary" threats. The
measures include prohibiting or restricting certain foreign commercial
transactions, currency exchanges, foreign investment, and certain exports
and imports. Id. at § 1701.
82. See Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States, U.S.
Department of the Treasury, Office of the Assistant Secretary (International
Affairs), Office of International Investment, http://www.treasury.gov/
offices/international-affairs/exon-florio (last visited May 10, 2006).
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leadership in areas affecting U.S. national security.8 3
An additional, unstated factor is frequently considered, which in
reality is a procedural factor which affects the other five: what
remedial or confidence-building measures can the parties to the
review undertake to limit the actual or perceived threat to
national security.
Most, if not all, of these factors were clearly implicated by the
Dubai World deal, and by the Lenovo acquisition of IBM's PC
division. The question, then, becomes whether the effects may be
remedied by other provisions of law, or whether other prophylactic
mechanisms can eliminate or reduce the vulnerability. Where
review indicates potential vulnerabilities, CFIUS and its
constituent members work with the acquiring and acquired
companies to ensure the emplacement of certain safeguards to
remedy the concern. For example, the government can mandate,
as a precursor to approval,
Special Security Agreements, which provide security
protection for classified or other sensitive contracts;
Board Resolutions, which, for instance, require a U.S.
company to certify that the foreign investor will not have
access to particular information or influence over
particular contracts; Proxy Agreements, which isolate the
foreign acquirer from any control or influence over the
U.S. company, and Network Security Agreements (NSAs).
84
During the CFIUS 30-day review period of the Dubai World
transaction, CFIUS member Department of Homeland Security
negotiated an "assurances letter" with the Dubai World and the
acquired company, P&O,85 in which, presumably, the company
agreed not to sponsor terrorist attacks inside the U.S.
The Exon-Florio/CFIUS process represents a check on foreign
governments or entities gaining control over U.S. business
organizations to the detriment of U.S. national security. With
83. See id.
84. See Kimmitt testimony, supra note 77.
85. See Press Release (JS-4071), U.S. Department of the Treasury,
CFIUS and the Protection of the National Security in the Dubai Ports World
Bid for Port Operations, Feb. 24, 2006,
http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/js4071.htm.
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some minor modifications by Congress, however, CFIUS, or a new
subsidiary or peer organization, could become an even more
effective guarantor of security in its review of business
transactions, particularly purchases of computer/information
technology equipment to be used in U.S. government offices
exercising national security/foreign affairs functions, such as the
intelligence agencies, Departments of Defense, State,
Transportation and Homeland Security, FBI, certain sections of
the Department of Justice, Congress, and segments of the U.S.
courts cleared to hear classified information (e.g., FISA courts).
Specifically, CFIUS, or a similar or subsidiary organization, could
be empowered by Congress to investigate and certify, through
reverse engineering or technical exploitation of a representative
sampling of U.S. government-purchased computer/IT products of:
" Foreign companies;
" U.S. companies engaging in manufacturing and
assembly of products or components overseas;
" U.S. companies engaging in manufacturing and
assembly of products from components manufactured
or assembled overseas; and
" U.S. companies purchased or controlled by foreign
business organizations or entities.
C. Recommendations for Exon-Florio Reform
Concerns with the efficient functioning of the Exon-
Florio/CFIUS process are not limited to those raised by this
author. In fact, in 2004, Senators Shelby, Bayh, and Sarbannes
wrote to the Government Accountability Office (GAO) (formerly
known as the General Accounting Office) requesting a report on
the functioning of the CFIUS process.86 GAO's 2005 report 87
identified several points of concern, including that the
Department of Treasury "narrowly defines what constitutes
'national security'; that CFIUS is reluctant to start 45 day formal
investigations because they perceive a negative impact on foreign
investment and a conflict with U.S. open investment policy; that
86. See Lee & Perkins, supra note 66.
87. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT GAO-05-686, DEFENSE
TRADE: ENHANCEMENTS TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EXON-FLORIO COULD
STRENGTHEN THE LAW'S EFFECTIVENESS 3-5 (2005) [hereinafter GAO Report].
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the resulting limitation of the CFIUS process to a 30-day
preliminary review period makes careful analysis very difficult at
best; and that failure to proceed to an investigation means that
few Presidential decisions will ever be required, thereby
eliminating reporting to the Congress and making Congressional
oversight impossible. s88 The GAO report noted that the narrow
definition of "national security," which was formalistic and did not
consider, for example, economic and energy security as
components of national security, would benefit from CFIUS
interpretive expansion of the term's meaning. 89 Moreover, GAO
found that the reluctance to initiate a formal (45-day)
investigation was, in part, a desire to facilitate FDI, for fear that
reading the investigation requirement too broadly would
discourage companies from trying to start businesses in the U.S.90
The GAO report sensibly recommended amendment of Exon-Florio
to be more clear regarding the facts that influence whether an
investigation should commence; to provide reallocated time to the
truncated timeline to permit thorough investigation and
decisionmaking; tracking of applications for CFIUS subsequently
withdrawn in order to fix highlighted problems that could not be
fixed within the mandated timetable that are never re-filed (in
other words, ensuring that companies that withdraw from the
approval process are courted and convinced to resubmit, to ensure
that investment opportunities do not disappear for lack of follow-
up, or to ensure that transactions do not proceed sub-rosa and
unapproved); and more robust reporting requirements to
Congress. 91
As of March 2, 2006, CFIUS had reviewed 1,604 foreign
acquisitions of U.S. companies or business interests, with its last
mandatory report to Congress regarding presidential action on
CFIUS investigatory recommendations occurring with regard to a
transaction between Singapore Technologies Telemedia and
Global Crossing, in September 2003.92 Absent more detailed,
year-by-year statistics not readily available, 1600 reviews over 18
years averages about 89 reviews each year. As of December, 2005,
88. See Sarbanes statement, supra note 65.
89. See GAO Report, supra note 87 at 11.
90. See id at 11.
91. See id at 39-46.; see also Lee & Perkins, supra note 66.
92. See Kimmitt testimony, supra note 77.
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CFIUS had initiated 45-day formal investigations (as opposed to
the initial 30-day review) in only 25 cases out of about 1600
reviews. 93 Of these 25 investigations, only 12 post-investigation
cases were presented to the president, 94 resulting in a single
presidential decision to disapprove a transaction and order
divestment, in the 1990 attempt by the Chinese-government
owned China National Aero-Technology Import and Export
Corporation (CATIC) to take over MAMCO Inc., a U.S.
manufacturer of metal civilian aircraft components.9 5 The last
mandatory report to Congress following presidential action on an
investigation (a transaction approval) occurred almost three years
ago.9 6 The reason for the dearth of CFIUS "45-day" investigations
and presidential actions is ambiguous. Absent more information
regarding the quality of CFIUS review, it is apparent that
CFIUS's review process does not frequently result in investigation
or presidential decision, much less denial. This may be a result of
companies' willingness to effect remedial measures - which may
be token measures or may be effective resolutions - to address
potential problems or concerns during the pre-filing informal
consultative stages, as much as it may be a result of an
insufficiently exacting review process. The quality and quantity of
CFIUS review is worth continued empirical, detailed analysis by
Congress' investigative arm, the GAO, particularly in light of
CFIUS approval of the politically-hot (and facially suspect) Dubai
ports and Lenovo-IBM deals.
I concur with the GAO recommendations, and add
recommendations regarding the 30/45/15 day timeline: that
Congress should request an additional GAO follow-up report, and
or draft remedial legislation, 97 on several precise issues:
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See Lee & Perkins, supra note 66.
96. See Kimmitt testimony, supra note 77.
97. Three bills have already been introduced to reform CFIUS: H.R.
4917, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006), To amend the Defense Production Act of
1950 to require notification to Congress after receipt of written notification of
proposed or pending mergers, acquisitions, or takeovers subject to
investigation under such Act, and for other purposes; S. 2442, 109th Cong.
(2d Sess. 2006), To require the President or the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States to submit to Congress draft investigation
reports on national security related investigations, to address mandatory
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1. Consider whether a remedial measure, such as an
assurances letter, or a Special Security Agreement or Board
Resolution by IBM or Lenovo, would prevent Chinese introduction
of "spyware" into computers engineered to gather and transmit
data to Chinese government client servers. How does the U.S.
Government wield a Board Resolution to stop a determined,
clandestine spy inserting technical listening or transmitting
devices into computers manufactured for use by U.S. government
agencies, or companies that will store valuable proprietary
information on the computers - particularly where the board is
under the thumb of the rival state government?98 The Board
Resolution is an inadequate remedy: if a company or agent of the
company is found to be violating the Board Resolution, civil
remedies may arise, including divestment. But in the meantime,
the damage is done - the horse, in the form of U.S. classified or
proprietary information, will have left the barn of information
security. What is required are more exacting standards of review -
including initial and continuous physical inspections of equipment
produced and sold by CFIUS-reviewed business enterprises, and of
equipment produced and sold to the U.S. government and U.S.
companies for domestic use, and provision for devastating civil
remedies, including divestment or liquidated damages secured by
bond, if necessary. This would prevent a company like Lenovo -
owned by the Chinese government - from acquiring a U.S.
company like IBM, which supplies IT equipment to the
government and U.S. industry. In other words, Exon-Florio
should be reformed to make it cost-prohibitive to compromise U.S.
security or spy on the U.S., particularly through technical means,
such as spyware or technical hardware inserted clandestinely into
U.S. products. Exon-Florio should, in short, leverage a company's
internal risk management proceedings to shift the burden of
staying clear of espionage-related activity to the company, which
is in the best position to avoid espionage-related activity in the
first place.
investigations by such committee, and for other purposes; S.2380, 109th
Cong. (2d Sess. 2006), To add the heads of certain Federal intelligence
agencies to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, to
require enhanced notification to Congress and for other purposes.
98. Recall, Lenovo is owned by the Chinese government. See supra note
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2. Companies are permitted to submit voluntarily to review.99
Most do, because entering into such an acquisition transaction
without review, only to have the government discover the
transaction after the' fact, investigate, and obtain a judicial
divestment order, would be extremely costly and would represent
a highly imprudent business practice.100  Additionally,
transactions can be reviewed based on a referral by a CFIUS
member with actual knowledge of the pending transaction. 10 1 On
the other hand, the process of discovering, investigating, and
seeking judicial enforcement of Exon-Florio could take months or
years; if such a transaction were structured for the express
purpose of committing or enabling national security or economic
espionage, a foreign power could reap the benefit of the
transaction for that period of months or years before the
divestment order would issue. This vulnerability augurs in favor
of requiring mandatory reporting of all Exon-Florio-covered
transactions and prescribing a specific criminal penalty for failing
to comply.
3. CFIUS also, by regulation, requires that review and
investigation, if warranted, of the transaction, including
presidential certification, must occur within 90 days of receipt of a
perfected notice. 102 This 90-day period includes a 30-day review
period, a 45-day investigation period (if necessary), and a 15-day
presidential action period.' 03
a. The compressed timeline is designed to prevent the
CFIUS review process from working as a distinctive to FDI.
However, thorough investigation of a potential national security
vulnerability in a complex business transaction might require
more time than 90 days; moreover, the CFIUS consensus
requirement, requiring that all members of CFIUS agree that
investigation of a particular transaction is not warranted, 104
rather than a more expedient majority or supermajority decision,
demonstrates that the government is willing to defer to
comprehensive security review rather than more efficient,
99. 31 C.F.R. § 800.
100. See, e.g., Lee & Perkins, supra note 66.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
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investment-friendly certification procedures. A reasonable
compromise reform, then, might be to prescribe through legislation
a revised, expanded, timeline for every case, to ensure a
comprehensive review in every case. In the alternative, if such
expansion of the timeline is deemed hostile to FDI, or is shown
through studies or practice to result in an intolerable net decline
in FDI, Exon-Florio could be revised to permit the President or the
Secretary of the Treasury to extend the 90-day timeline in
exceptionally complex cases in which more time would work to the
material advantage of the government, to balance FDI-
attractiveness against national security concerns. The CFIUS
regulations prescribing this timeline were, of course, authored in
1991, before the ascendancy of new national security threats (the
age of terror and emerging state-based threats), and at the end of
an era of an old one (the Soviet empire). Changing times may
merit changing standards: while expediency in review of most
cases is an inherently good thing, flexibility in prescribed review
timelines in exceptional circumstances is a necessary and
appropriate guarantor of security. Query: whether such an
extension of the investigation time really would work to
discourage multimillion or even multibillion dollar corporate
acquisitions; in other words, will companies really fail to invest in
American companies over an additional 45-day delay in approval,
or is the specter of decreasing FDI a red herring? The FDI impact
of prescribing such flexibility should be studied empirically by the
appropriate authority before changing the current standards, so
that the appropriate decision can be reached on the balance
between encouraging FDI and enhancing security. Moreover, the
utility of the consensus requirement of CFIUS, which portends well
for security concerns because it requires all members of CFIUS to
agree that a transaction should go forward, should be studied as
well, examining the balance of expediency and encouragement of
investment against the guarantee of security that consensus
approval provides.
b. Congress should also examine whether CFIUS'
reluctance to initiate formal, 45-day investigations due in any part
to apprehension that a thorough investigation cannot be
completed within 45-days, thereby shading the decision on
whether to engage in the investigation to begin with; if so, I would
recommend that Congress adopt legislation permitting the
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Secretary of the Treasury to grant up to two automatic extensions
of 45 days each to complete the investigation; in the alternative, the
entire 90 day period could be doubled or fractionally extended, to
ensure time to conduct quality reviews.
4. Prescribing substantial civil penalties expressed in terms of
percentage of net worth of the acquiring company or some other
value expression that applies proportional disincentives to large
and small business organizations, rather than in absolute terms of
dollars, for companies who undertake transactions without
submitting to the CFIUS review process, gambling that the
government will not order divestiture once the train has left the
station, or for companies found, after approval, to engage in or
facilitate activity detrimental to national security, such as
espionage.
5. In its analysis of the national security impact of business
transactions involving foreign entities, such as the Dubai ports
transaction or the Lenovo acquisition of IBM's personal computer
division, which was also approved by CFIUS, CFIUS relies in part
on recommendations and intelligence estimates to assess threats
and vulnerabilities. 105  In particular, CFIUS efforts are
augmented by the Intelligence Community Acquisition Risk
Center (CARC), a new organization that reports to the Director of
National Intelligence tasked with conducting intelligence and
counterintelligence risk assessments of certain commercial
transactions referred to it by CFIUS. 10 6 For example, CARC also
provided a risk assessment on the Dubai Ports World deal early in
2006, advising that the transaction could proceed. 107 Clearly,
CARC and CFIUS are designed to work together to limit national
security vulnerabilities from foreign investment, despite the
political whirlwind that accompanied the Dubai ports agreement.
Reform the CFIUS structure to incorporate intelligence estimates,
instead of outsourcing them to the CARC - in other words, merge
CARC into CFIUS, while retaining direct CARC connections to the
intelligence community and DNI, for the purpose of ensuring the
insulation of the CARC's intelligence analysis from political
105. See Kimmitt testimony, supra note 77.
106. Id.
107. See David Morgan, Obscure U.S. Intelligence Agency Assessed Ports
Deal, REUTERS, Feb. 23, 2006, http://go.reuters.co.uk/printerFriendlyPopup
.jhtml?type=worldNews&storyID=1097504.
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pressures. There is no apparent reason why CFIUS and CARC
should exist as separate entities; rather, they should be merged to
gain synergies and accountability over the intelligence risk
assessment process. Given the pervasive "fiefdom" characteristic
of interagency politics in the U.S. Government, a merger would
come laden with a complex set of subissues, but the most
significant one is probably where the new, merged organization
would reside. The Department of the Treasury's interests and
expertise in monitoring the influence of foreign investment policy
in the U.S. counsels that Treasury should maintain substantial
influence on the process. However, the potential nexus between
FDI and terrorism/espionage dictates that the organization should
have robust DNI representation to inform CFIUS decisions. For
example, DNI could be required to second to CFIUS/CARC a
career intelligence professional, preferably of Senior Executive
Service rank, as the deputy director or staff director of the new
organization, along with hearty staff representation.
6. Install an equitably rotating chair, with Treasury serving
as principal deputy during the periods that Treasury does not. hold
the chair, instead of relying on Treasury to chair CFIUS all the
time. The GAO report identified the reluctance of Treasury to
interpret "national security" with sufficient breadth to sweep in
more transactions for review; 108 in other words, Treasury
leadership of CFIUS may represent a liability through cultural
cautiousness. This may be because the Department of Treasury is
impregnated with an "FDI first" cultural attitude, in much the
same way that defense or intelligence community representatives
might be infected with a "security first" presumption. By rotating
the chair, a more balanced "investment/security" culture of
practice should emerge, changing the culture of CFIUS gradually
to cure this defect identified by the GAO report.
7. If rotating the chair is an insufficient measure to change
the culture of cautiousness with regard to investigations, then
Congress ought to more closely study the issue and mandate a
shift in culture through legislation, perhaps by assigning a
definition of "national security" in an amendment to Exon-Florio
that opens the field of transactions that should be reviewed and
investigated. The GAO report notes that Treasury, among other
108. See GAO Report, supra note 87 at 11.
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agency members of CFIUS, define "threat to national security" as
"risks associated with export-controlled technologies, classified
contracts, and specific derogatory intelligence with respect to a
foreign acquiring company,"1 09 rioting that such a definition
probably excludes review of transactions touching "critical
infrastructure, defense supply, and defense technological
superiority."I10 Under the present standard of practice, such a
narrow definition might also exclude from routine review
transactions such as the Lenovo acquisition of the IBM subsidiary
(although a 30-day review of that transaction was, in fact, taken).
One set of commentators notes that Senator Inhofe, a frequent
critic of CFIUS, has suggested that the concept of national
security should be interpreted to include economic and energy
security, in addition to more traditional interpretations.11 1
Congress may provide minimum standards that must be
considered and weave "aggressive review" intent language into the
legislative history of the amendment, then leave it to the agency
to determine the remainder of the content of "national security"
for the purpose of CFIUS review determinations. Congress could
also sunset the amendment, which would provide an automatic
occasion for reviewing CFIUS's performance in effecting the new
balance between security and FDI.
8. Congress should consider shifting the burden of proof and
concurrence quorum required to avoid convening an investigation.
Currently, CFIUS convenes a "45-day investigation" only if all
members agree that one should be conducted. 112 Congress should
consider mandating 45-day investigations in all cases, permitting
CFIUS to vote by consensus to invoke an exception to avoid
convening an investigation. Alternatively, rather than shifting
the presumption of "no investigation," Congress could mandate a
quorum smaller than consensus to convene an investigation, such
as a majority or 2/3 vote of the members.
9. Through amendment to Exon-Florio, explicitly and clearly
empower the president to seek judicial divestment or dissolution
orders for corporate transactions previously reviewed and certified
109. Id. (citing GAO Report, supra note 87 at 39-46).
110. Id.
111. See Lee & Perkins, supra note 66.
112. Id.
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by CFIUS (no 45-day investigation) or the president (in the case of
a transaction on which the president is required to act), or for
corporate transactions not previously examined under the statute,
where one or more of the business organizations involved in the
transaction conducts espionage-related activities. In other words,
amend Exon-Florio to reach the facially-innocent transaction that
later reveals itself to be an instrumentality of espionage, and
provide a divestment/dissolution remedy to deter through
economic prohibition, by making it too expensive for companies to
spy or enable spying through design or neglect.
10. Finally, reform CFIUS or a subsidiary entity to
incorporate a technical review mechanism - perhaps
establishment of a lower-level working group, etc. - to conduct
technical review of products purchased by the U.S. government
with foreign made, originated, assembled, or distributed products
or components, including a legislative provision to prescribe
substantial civil penalties for failure to disclose such products or
components. The newly merged CFIUS/CARC working group
entity should be resourced to conduct technical exploitation of
products acquired from abroad for U.S. government use, including
reverse-engineering of prioritized representative samples of
purchased equipment.
V. THE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S FUNCTION
IN COUNTERESPIONAGE AND TECHNOLOGY SECURITY
Finally, within the Department of Defense, the Defense
Technology Security Administration (DTSA) is tasked by the
Secretary of Defense with reviewing and coordinating the issuance
of thousands of export licenses each year for U.S. technology
pending sale to other countries. 113 The DoD Manual mandating
procedures for information security in procurement, the DoD
National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual,
"provides baseline standards for the protection of classified
information released or disclosed to industry in connection with
classified contracts"'114 - in other words, it is designed to prevent
113. See Defense Technology Security Administration,
http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/sections/policy-offices/ dtsalindex.html (last
visited May 1, 2006).
114. DoD 5220.22-M, National Industrial Security Program Operating
Manual, http://www.dss.mil/files/pdf/nispom2006-5220.pdf (last visited March
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the release of classified information to industry and, thus, making
it vulnerable to disclosure to foreign powers.
There does not, however, appear to be an agency in DoD with
explicit responsibility for reviewing products being purchased by
the U.S. from abroad, particularly information systems. One
worthwhile reform to the DTSA mission would be to task it with
developing and implementing procedures to ensure the
testing/reverse-engineering of a representative sampling of
information technology gear imported from other countries for the
presence of bugs, listening devices, or programming code designed
to capture and transmit automatically data to a receiving agent of
a foreign power. If this function were to be exercised
comprehensively by CFIUS/CARC, then there would be no need
for DoD to exercise the function independently; but if
CFIUS/CARC cannot provide a comprehensive technical security
review process at the DNI level, then DoD should be able to guard
its own secrets from foreign exploitation through an expanded
mission for DTSA.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, technically-driven parasite programs and
equipment, engineered to "ride along" on commercial host
products acquired from abroad or from domestic sources controlled
by foreign entities from abroad, represent a substantial espionage
threat to U.S. entities, particularly the government. The methods
of attacking this threat could be myriad and varied; the minor
modification and use of RICO and focused efforts by a reformed
and streamlined CFIUS could go a long way toward ensuring that
those items of electronic equipment acquired for the conduct of
business and government work do not silently spy on U.S.
policymakers and implementers by passively gathering
information and data and transmitting it to foreign power
receivers. The government can leverage the power of industry to
self-police their manufacturing, assembly, and distribution
processes to keep them pure from the corrupting influence of
foreign intelligence collection. Finally, CFIUS reform has
implications above and beyond simply limiting technically-based
espionage. CFIUS is the primary means by which the U.S.
2, 2007).
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government screens foreign influence through business acquisition
in the U.S. generally. Improvements in its efficiency and
effectiveness are vital to preserving U.S. national security,
particularly limiting espionage and counterterrorism
vulnerabilities.
